Philosophical Moral Psychology
Hannah Altehenger (Bielefeld), Leo Menges (Salzburg), Nora
Please contact one of the organisers if you would like to join for lunch
or dinner (in person or via email: firstname.lastname@example.org- muenchen.de).
Please note that this will be at your own expense.
- DFG, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
- GAP, Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie
- Münchner Universitätsgesellschaft, LMU Munich
Monday, July 23rd
Collective Moral Decisions: What Is So Good About Deciding the Good
Together? (Ophelia Deroy)
Aristotle is often credited for having first highlighted the benefits of collective
decision-making and anticipated the 'wisdom of the crowds' effects which are popular
nowadays in many practical matters, which is missed by the current experiments.
In this talk, I will explore this gap, and empirical as well as conceptual challenges.
4:15 - 5:45 pm
Resurrecting the Will (Chandra Sripada)
For centuries, a will-based psychology prevailed in western philosophy,
but in the contemporary era, it has come to occupy the margins. The aim
of this paper is to argue that the abandonment of the faculty of will
has been a mistake. I review an extensive body of theory and findings
from the interdisciplinary cognitive control research program, which
investigates mechanisms by which higher-order controlled processes
inhibit or otherwise bias the operation of automatic response systems.
The picture of mental architecture that emerges from this research, I
argue, vindicates a will-based psychology. I consider how resurrecting
of the will affects theorizing about key topics in moral psychology,
such as strength of will, weakness of will, and freedom of will.
Tuesday, July 24
The Moral Status of Psychopaths (Gary Watson)
I have argued that psychopaths lack the capacity to recognize and
respond to the validity of moral demands, and that this incapacity
disqualifies them from moral accountability relations. But to hold this,
I must maintain that they can be moral subjects without being moral
agents. We are familiar with the possibility of such a mixed moral
status in our regard for non-human animals, and of small children, and
perhaps other marginal agents, such as victims of advanced dementia.
Psychopaths are moral subjects, that is, sources of moral constraints on
the part of others, not just in virtue of their vulnerability to
suffering, but because of their capacity for a kind of reflective
agency. In particular, they can, by their choices, incur
responsibilities and liabilities. How can their choices make these kinds
of difference, if they are not, as I seem to have suggested, moral
agents in any sense? That is the central question of this